Charles Crawford looks into the theories behind why our behaviour is not always as ethical as we think it might be, and the growing policy trend of 'nudging' personal choices.
These days all sorts of ingenious studies set out to measure 'ethicality', and to identify why people privately and at work fall short of the moral standards that they themselves champion. The authors share many vivid, well researched examples:
In one university, books on ethics are more likely to go missing from libraries than non-ethics books;
Organisational diversity programs can lead to reduced diversity; Setting up punitive systems (e.g. fines) to deter unwanted behaviour can prompt more of the unwanted behaviour -people may stop looking at that behaviour in ethical terms and instead treat the issue as a simple cost problem: "What's it worth to me to avoid being caught?" (This last one makes especially depressing reading when we contemplate the thousands of new criminal offences set up under the UK's recent Labour governments.)
The authors convincingly draw on these and other studies to explore how misconceived self-awareness creates 'bounded ethicality' and moral blind spots. People tend subconsciously to discriminate in favour of 'their' group, even with the best intentions to do the opposite. Or they may genuinely fail to spot that their short-term private or corporate actions have longer-term negative moral consequences. Or they can tend to explain away unethical behaviour by their group while focusing on supposed unethical behaviour by others. And so on.
This book takes such studies and accompanying methodology to look at different big-ticket policy outcomes in the public and private sector (how far car-makers should install safety features, unsatisfactory US laws on transparency by big accounting firms, controversial climate change legislation, the US federal budget deficit). They argue that in each case better outcomes could have been achieved had the key people involved been more aware of their own unconscious biases.
Having identified many subtle problems, the authors do less well in identifying ways to improve things. No surprise here -reasonable people flatly disagree over which outcomes (and methods) are or aren't 'ethical'.
The authors argue that organisations should listen to their own 'organisational talk' -what examples are widely cited of virtue (or bad behaviour) being rewarded? They describe how one Fortune 50 corporation produced a video describing how four of its employees had gone over their bosses' heads to keep the corporation from acting unethically; the video concluded by showing those four people in senior positions. The message to its employees was clear: that corporation took ethical issues seriously and rewarded employees who responded, especially when it seemed professionally risky to do so.
Another example is less convincing. The authors seem to favour the state enforcing a default 'opt-out' organ donor policies (i.e. allowing a dead person's organs to be used to help others unless the person concerned had asked that that not be done). Some countries do, others don't. Those who do have an 'opt-out' policy see many more lives saved, as there are more organs available for emergency transplant. But are such 'consequentialist' outcomes the only ones that count?
